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It does not mean that consciousness is general,


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a
uni­
versal
pan-psyche.
A
consciousness
is
even
at
the
start
particular,
for
the
objects
of
which
it
is
conscious
are
particular
objects
and
not
the
whole
universe.
Thus
the
consciousnesses
of
two
persons
are
always
individual
and
always
self-eonsciousnesses,
but
to
be
individual
and
to
be
self­
conscious
does
not
mean
to
be
personal.
Another
way
of
putting
it
is
to
say
that
the
Ego
is
"on
the
side
of
the
psychic."
(p.
106)
Sartre
makes
a
sharp
distinction
between
the
individual
consciousness
in
its
purity
and
psychic
qualities,
by
which
he
means
what
is
ordinarily
thought
of
as
the
personality.
What
he
calls
the
view
holds
that
the
Ego
is
responsible
for
psychic
states
(e.g.,
love;
hate) and
that
these
in
turn
"
determine
our
consciousness.
The
reality,
he
claims,
is
exactly
the
reverse.
Consciousness
determines
the
state,
and
the
states
constitute
the
Ego.
For
example,
my
immediate
reaction
of
repulsion
or
attraction
to
some­
one
is
a
consciollsness.
The
unity
which
the
reflective
conscioulbess
establishes
between
this
reaction
and
earlier
similar
ones
constitutes
my
state
of
love
or
hate.
My
Ego
stands
as
the
ideal
unity
of
all
of
my
states,
qualities,
and
actions,
but
as
such
it
is
an
object-pole,
not
a
subject.
It
is
the
"flux
of
Consciousness
constituting
itself
as
the
unity
of
itself."
(p.
100)
Thus
the
Ego
is
a
"synthesis
of
interiority
and
transcendence."
(p.
Ill)
The
interiority
of
the
pre-reflective
consciousness
consists
in
the
fact
that
for
it,
to
know
itself
and
to
be
are
the
same;
but
this
pure
interiority
can
only
be
lived,
not
contemplated.
By
definition
pure
interi­
ority
can
not
have
an
"outside."
When
consciousness
tries
to
turn
back
upon
itself
and
contemplate
itself,
it
can
reflect
on
this
interiority
but
only
by
making
it
an
object.
The
Ego
is
the
interiority
of
conscious­
ness
when
reflected
upon
by
itself.
Although
it
stands
as
an
object-pole
of
the
unreflective
attitude,
it
appears
only
in
the
world
of
reflection.
Less
technically
we
may
note
that
the
Ego
stands
in
the
same
relation
to
all
the
psychic
objects
of
consciousness
as
the
unity
called
"the
world"
stands.in
relation
to
the
physical
objects
of
consciousness.
If
conscious­
ness
directs
itself
upon
anyone
of
its
own
acts
or
states,
upon
any
psychic
object,
this
points
to
the
Ego
in
exactly
the
same
way
that
any
physical
object
points
to
"the
world."
Both
"world"
and
"Ego"
are
transcendent
objects-in
reality,
ideal
unities.
They
differ
however
in
that
the
psychic
is
dependent
on
consciousness
and
in
one
sense
has
been
constituted
by
it
whereas
objects
in
the
world
are
not
created
by
consciousness.
As
for
the
"I"
and
the
"Me,"
these
are
but
two
aspects
of
the
Ego,
distinguished
according
to
their
function.
The
"I"
is
the
ideal
unity
of
actions,
and
the
"Me"
that
of
states
and
qualities.
Three
consequences
of
this
position
should
perhaps
be
noted
in
particular,
one
because
it
is
a
view
which
Sartre
later
explicitly
aban­
doned,
the
other
two
because.
although
merelY
in
this
article,
they
form
the
basis
for
some
of
the
most
significant
sections
of
Being

,
I,
,
,
I,I
1'f
,i
xii
BEING
AND
NOTHINGNESS
1
1
'1
and
Nothingness.
First,
Sartre
claims
that
once
we
put
the
"I"
out
of
consciousness
and
I
into
the
world
(in
the
sense
that
it
is
nowthe
object
and
not
the
subject
of
consciousness)
we
have
defeated
any
argument
for
solipsism.
For
while
we
can
still
say
that
only
absolute
consciousness
exists
as
absolute,
I
the
same
is
not
true
for
the
personal
"I."
My"!"
is
no
more
certain
{II
than
the
"I"
of
other
people.
Later,
as
we
shall
see,
Sartre
rejected
this
1['
as
a
refutation
of
solipsism
and
declared
that
neither
my
own
existence
I'
nor
that
of
the
Other
can
be
"proved"
but
that
both
are
"factual
neces­
sities"
which
we
can
doubt
only
abstractly.
'I,
Second,
Sartre
believes
that
by
taking
the
"I"
and
the
"Me"
out
of
'III
consciousness
and
by
viewing
consciousness
as
absolute
and
non-personal,
and
as
responsible
for
the
constitution
of
Being
"as
a
world"
and
of
its
'I"
own
activities
as
an
Ego,
he
has
defended
phenomenology
against
any
charge
that
it
has
taken
refuge
from
the
real
world
in
an
idealism.
If
the
Ego
and
the
world
are
both
objects
of
consciousness,
if
neither
has
created
the
other,
then
consciousness
by
establishing
their
relations
to
each
other
insures
the
active
participation
of
the
person
in
the
world.
Most
important
of
all,
tbere
are
in
Sartre's
claim
that
consciousness
infinitely
overflows
the
"I"
which
ordinarily
serves
to
unify
it,
the
founda­
I
I'
tion
for
his
view
of
anguish,
the
germ
of
his
doctrine
of
"bad
faith,"
and
a
basis
for
his
belief
in
the
absolute
freedom
of
consciousness.
"Conscious­
I
II
I)
ness
is
afraid
of
its
own
spontaneity
because
it
feels
itself
to
be
beyond
freedom."
(p.
17.0)
In
other
words
we
feel
vertigo
or
anguish
before
our
recognition
that
nothing
in
our
own
pasts
or
discernible
personality
in­
II
sures
our
following
any
of
our
usual
patterns
of
conduct.
There
is
nothing
to
prevent
consciousness
from
making
a
wholly
new
choice
of
its
way
of
being.
By
means
of
the
Ego,
consciousness
can
partially
protect
itself
ii
II,
from
tIl
is
freedom
so
limitless
that
it
threatens
the
vcry
bounds
of
I
personality.

"Ever

 

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eat plenty of l dont need anyone to take care of me

 

wouldnt call an excerpt from being and nothingness "stupid shit" but to each their own i guess

 

man you should've just called me a pleb but ymmv

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